Economic Analysis and Competition Policy Research

DoorDash’s Acquisition of Instagram Will Hurt Grocery Stores. It Should be Blocked.

Because consumers and grocery stores are aligned when it comes to high commissions, the agencies should focus their analysis on the merger’s impact on grocery stores.

Something unprecedented happened under President Biden’s Antitrust Division at the Department of Justice—a merger was stopped because it threatened to harm input providers. The merger was Penguin Random House’s proposed acquisition of Simon & Schuster, and the threatened input providers were book authors. By removing a bidder (Simon & Schuster) in a concentrated input market for book manuscripts, the merger threatened to decrease authors’ earnings. The approach was novel, and it paved the way for future enforcers to block other harmful mergers.

The same approach should be used to stop DoorDash’s proposed acquisition of Instacart. 

Focusing the competitive lens

The two companies compete head-to-head to deliver groceries to American consumers. Like most merging firms, they’ll likely claim the relevant market includes all competitors, no matter how distant. Instacart handles 22 percent of all online grocery deliveries per Salehoo, which ranks Instacart at roughly the same size as Amazon and Walmart. But Amazon and Walmart deliver their own groceries and aren’t a realistic option for other grocers trying to reach shoppers. For grocers ranging from big national chains like Kroger to regional players and locally owned stores, third-party services like Instacart and DoorDash are the only realistic option.

Among third-party providers, Instacart’s share is much higher—58 percent according to the Food Institute. And DoorDash has been an increasingly significant rival in this space.

To compete for shoppers in the output market, third-party delivery companies need agreements with input suppliers, including grocery stores. Instacart has focused on grocery delivery from its launch, and now boasts partnerships across the country. Although DoorDash initially found its footing in restaurant deliveries, in 2020 it launched a rival grocery delivery service with supermarket partners like Smart & Final, Meijer, and Fresh Thyme. 

Gaining business with a grocery store requires delivery companies to compete on several dimensions, including price (the delivery service’s commission). Instacart and DoorDash compete head-to-head. In fall 2025, for example, both Instacart and DoorDash announced expanded partnerships with the same national grocery chain, Kroger. 

Amazon and Walmart aren’t in the business of boosting their rivals—that’s why Amazon’s online superstore doesn’t list Walmart products, and Walmart’s doesn’t feature Amazon products. 

So it would be a real stretch to include those integrated providers when calculating grocery delivery market shares. When Kroger negotiates with delivery providers, the vertically integrated giants (Amazon and Walmart) don’t offer an outside option that could increase Kroger’s leverage. Any “commission” Walmart charges itself for grocery delivery (an internal price) doesn’t affect the actual commission rates Instacart charges grocers. 

Accurately capturing competitive dynamics therefore requires either narrowing the market to exclude integrated providers or excluding sales by integrated delivery services from the market-share denominator.  The upshot: this market is significantly more concentrated than the “all online grocery” figures might suggest. This proposed merger would extinguish head-to-head competition for grocery stores’ business, predictably letting the combined company take a bigger cut of the grocery bill—and ultimately leading to higher grocery prices. 

Consumers and grocers are aligned against the middleman tax

Armchair commentators like Matt Yglesias claim the Biden-era expansion of antitrust to protect input suppliers was misguided, “embarrassing,” and out-of-touch in an inflationary moment. Of course, Matt’s been wrong quite often, and this is one more to add to his list. Protecting input suppliers often helps prevent harm to consumers too. And that’s the case here: When a grocery store is forced to pay higher commissions to delivery companies like Instacart and DoorDash, those commissions get passed through to consumers in the form of higher food prices. Indeed, if the commissions (a tax, really) on grocery stores increases as a result of the merger, consumers will pay higher prices.

Percentage-based ad valorem taxes like Instacart’s and DoorDash’s commissions (referred to as “service fees” on their websites) have been shown mathematically to have the same effect on prices as fixed per-unit taxes when the underlying industry (here, grocery stores) subject to the tax is perfectly competitively supplied. Even when the underlying industry is not perfectly competitively supplied, so long as the party paying the tax (here, a grocery store) incurs marginal costs in the sale of each online order (here, the wholesale cost of groceries), an ad valorem tax can be shown to account for a substantial percentage of the pass-through of a per unit tax. Hence, consumers and grocery stores are aligned when it comes to fighting high commissions.

Analysts at OwnDeliv note that grocery stores—when permitted—increase the price of an order before Instacart’s commissions are applied, in order to cover the cost of the commission and to encourage in-store purchases, a form of pass-through: “There is, however, a hidden cost most people miss: Instacart prices are set by the retailers, not by Instacart, and retailers typically charge 10-15% more for items ordered through the app than their in-store prices. A $100 in-store shop commonly becomes $112 through Instacart before a single delivery fee is added.” A CNET comparison of prices between in-store and Instacart groceries at Kroger in January 2025 revealed “that groceries, without taking into account any additional fees for using Instacart, were about 10% higher, on average.”

Based on our review of public records, it appears that DoorDash’s commissions are higher than Instacart’s—providing DoorDash an anticompetitive reason to eliminate a rival. Instacart generally charges grocery stores a commission of 5 percent of the bill. In contrast, DoorDash charges grocery stores commissions ranging from 5 to 15 percent. The ability to collect fees at the high end of that range is much easier when your closest rival can no longer underprice you. Indeed, prior to the announcement of the merger, DoorDash was moving away from its 15 percent service fee with a new service called DashPass.

Beware forced price-parity

Instacart would dearly love to stop grocers from offering lower in-store prices. Delivery surcharges mean online shoppers actually internalize the cost of using Instacart’s service, instead of externalizing it onto the rest of us.

That’s why Instacart has been making a massive push to try to stop grocers from surcharging for online orders. As part of that campaign, it’s already started guiding users away from grocers that offer lower in-store prices.

A combined Instacart/DoorDash would wield even more leverage to force price-parity provisions onto grocers. Being able to corral more shoppers in a given geographic market would give Instacart more power over grocers who dare to offer lower in-store prices. If price parity prevails, the commissions will not just grow, but spread to all shoppers. Indeed, a combined Instacart/DoorDash would have more power to force price parity on grocers, eliminating lower in-store prices and discounts.

Unconvincing efficiency rationale

In a Nov. 5 story titled “Can a DoorDash-Instacart Fusion Stand Up to Amazon and Walmart,” The Economist accepted the merging parties’ supposed efficiency rationale for the merger: These horizontal rivals in grocery delivery need to merge to better compete against Amazon and Walmart. As noted above, Amazon and Walmart together account for about roughly half of America’s online-grocery sales, implying even a combined DoorDash and Instacart would be small by comparison. 

But that market lens is too broad. And, more fundamentally, this proposed merger wouldn’t address any of the real problems facing the grocery sector today. Walmart’s size helps it ensure smaller rival grocers pay higher prices. Amazon built its fulfillment and delivery empire by coercing sellers, misclassifying workers, and busting unions. Combining Instacart and DoorDash won’t help grocers compete against these giants. Much the opposite: by squeezing grocers even harder, the merged middleman would end up driving even more shoppers into the waiting arms of Amazon and Walmart. 

Voters sent a message on affordability

In the recent mid-term elections, voters expressed their displeasure with rising prices, especially given stagnant nominal wages. Food-at-home inflation spiked at 13.5 percent in 2022, fell to moderate levels (below two percent) by 2024, but reached nearly three percent again by April 2026. A functional government would respond by, at minimum, stopping further concentrations of economic power. Federal enforcers, an increasingly active group of state attorneys general, or both should block any merger that threatens to increase grocers’ costs. With U.S. household budgets already stretched thin, stopping a merger that threatens to increase food prices even further is a no-brainer.

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